<\4  D  .  11 


3 


Ct- 


REMOTE 


66tu 

1st 


Congress,  1 

l  Session. 


SENATE. 


JRept.  176, 
Part  2. 


TREATY  OF  PEACE  WITH  GERMANY. 


September  11,  1919. — Ordered  to  be  printed. 


Mr.  Hitchcock,  from  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  sub¬ 
mitted  the  following 

o 

VIEWS  OF  THE  MINORITY. 

[To  accompany  S.  Doc.  51.] 

The  undersigned  members  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
unite  in  urging  the  early  ratification  of  the  pending  treaty  of  peace 
without  amendments  and  without  reservations. 

We  deplore  the  long  and  unnecessary  delay  to  which  the  treaty 
has  been  subjected  while  locked  up  in  the  committee  whose  majority 
decisions  and  recommendations  were  from  the  start  a  foregone  con¬ 
clusion.  They  could  have  been  made  in  July  as  well  as  in  September 
and  would  have  been  the  same. 

The  industrial  world  is  in  ferment,  the  financial  world  in  doubt, 
and  commerce  halts  while  this  great  delay  in  the  peace  settlement  has 
been  caused  by  the  majority  of  a  committee  known  to  be  out  of 
harmony  with  the  majority  of  the  Senate  and  the  majority  the 
people.  This  is  government  by  obstruction  as  well  as  by  a  minority. 

Our  export  trade  already  shows  the  undeniable  effects  of  delay  and 
doubt  in  treaty  ratification  and  peace  settlement.  For  the  first 
seven  months  following  the  armistice  our  exports  averaged  almost 
seven  hundred  millions  per  month  but  in  July  tney  fell  to  five  hundred 
and  seventy  millions  of  dollars.  Europe  undoubtedly  wants  our 
products  but  can  only  take  them  in  full  quantity  if  our  financial 
institutions  provide  the  credit  to  bridge  over  the  period  necessar}^  to 
restore  European  industry  to  productiveness.  This  private  credit 
can  not  and  will  not  be  furnished  as  long  as  the  peace  settlement  is  in 
doubt.  Public  credit  has  heretofore  carried  this  great  balance  of 
trade.  Since  the  armistice  was  signed  our  Government  has  advanced 
to  European  governments  nearly  twro  and  one-half  billion  dollars 
which  was  almost  enough  to  cover  the  balance  of  trade  during  the 
eight  months  period. 

Our  Government,  however,  has  about  reached  the  end  of  its 
authority  given  by  Congress  and  will  advance  but  little  more.  From 


n 


2 


TREATY  OF  PEACE  WITH  GERMANY. 


now  on,  if  we  are  to  keep  up  our  commerce  with  Europe,  private  enter¬ 
prise  must  furnish  the  credit  to  cover  the  trade  balance  till  European 
industries  get  started  and  are  able  to  pay  us  with  their  goods.  Peace 
settlement  delays  and  doubts  paralyze  this  revival.  If  uncertainty 
continues  depression  is  inevitable. 

The  claim  by  the  majority  of  this  committee  on  page  3  of  their 
report  that  we  have  exported  over  eleven  million  dollars  worth  of 
goods  to  Germany  since  the  armistice  and  without  a  peace  settlement 
is  no  doubt  true.  To  other  countries  during  the  same  period  we  ex¬ 
ported  over  five  thousand  million  dollars  worth.  What  was  exported 
to  Germany  as  stated  by  the  majority  report  was  practically  nothing. 
It  is  only  14  cents  worth  of  American  products  for  each  person  in 
Germany  in  seven  months  or  2  cents  per  person  per  month,  yet  the 
majority  report  boasts  of  it  as  evidence  of  trade  revival  in  spite  of 
treaty  delay.  The  same  statesmen  gravely  assure  us  that  their 
figures  prove  that  it  is  a  mere  delusion  to  say  we  can  not  trade,  with 
Germany  till  a  peace  settlement  is  made.  Two  cents  per  month  per 
capita  is  hardly  trading  with  Germany. 

Referring  to  the  action  of  the  majority  of  the  committee,  we  unite 
in  opposing  and  condemning  the  recommendations  both  as  to  textual 
amendments  and  as  to  proposed  reservations.  As  far  as  the  proposed 
textual  amendments  are  concerned  we  see  no  reason  to  discuss  their 
character  at  length.  In  our  opinion  they  have  no  merit,  but  whether 
they  be  good,  bad,  or  indifferent  their  adoption  by  the  Senate  can  have 
no  possible  effect  except  to  defeat  the  participation  of  the  United 
States  in  the  treaty.  None  of  them  could  by  any  possibility  be 
accepted  even  by  the  great  nations  associated  with  the  United  States 
in  the  war,  and  none  of  them  could  by  any  possibility  be  dictated  to 
Germany.  To  adopt  any  one  of  them,  therefore,  is  equivalent  to 
rejecting  the  treaty. 

The  suggestion  on  page  4  of  the  majority  report  that  the  peace 
conference  is  still  in  session  in  Paris  and  could  consider  any  textual 
amendments  to  the  treaty  made  by  the  Senate,  and  that  German 
representatives  could  be  brought  to  Paris  for  that  purpose,  indicates 
a  total  misconception  of  the  situation.  The  peace  conference  has 
acted  finally  upon  this  treaty.  Great  Britain  has  ratified  it,  France 
is  about  to  do  so,  and  with  the  action  of  one  other  power  it  will  in 
all  human  probability  be  in  actual  operation  even  before  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States  reaches  a  decision.  Moreover,  the  peace  con¬ 
ference  possesses  no  further  -power  to  “  bring  German  representa¬ 
tives  to  Paris.”  The  power  of  compulsion  has  been  exhausted. 
Germany  was  told  where  to  sign  and  when  to  sign  and  when  to 
ratify,  and  Germany  has  closed  the  chapter  by  signing  and  by  rati¬ 
fying.  Germany  can  not  be  compelled  to  do  anything  more  or  dif¬ 
ferent  with  regard  to  this  treaty  by  being  confronted  with  an 
amended  treaty  whether  once  a  month,  day,  or  week.  There  must 
be  a  finality  to  ultimata  in  a  treaty  by  compulsion.  If  an  amended 
treaty  is  not  signed  b}^  Germany  then  it  is  in  none  of  its  parts  bind¬ 
ing  on  her. 

To  adopt  an  amendment  or  to  reject  the  treaty  means  that  the 
United  States  will  sacrifice  all  of  the  concessions  secured  from  Ger¬ 
many  by  a  dictated  peace.  While  these  concessions  are  not  so  large 
as  those  which  other  nations  associated  with  us  secure  in  repara- 


TREATY  OF  PEACE  WITH  GERMANY. 


B 


tions,  they  are  nevertheless  of  tremendous  importance  and  could 
only  he  secured  under  a  dictated  peace.  Among  the  concessions 
which  the  United  States  would  sacrifice  by  the  adoption  of  any 
amendment  or  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  may  be  included  the 
following: 

First.  Germany’s  acknowledgment  of  responsibility  for  the  war 
and  her  promise  to  make  restitution  for  damages  resulting  from  it. 

Second.  Germany’s  promise  to  us  in  the  treaty  that  she  will  not 
impose  higher  or  other  customs  duties  or  charges  on  our  goods  than 
those  charged  to  the  most  favored  nation  and  will  not  prohibit  or 
restrict  or  discriminate  against  imports  directly  or  indirectly  from 
our  country. 

Third.  Germany’s  promise  to  us  in  the  treaty  that  she  will  make  no 
discrimination  in  German  ports  on  shipping  bearing  our  flag  and  that 
our  shipping  in  German  ports  will  be  given  as  favorable  treatment  as 
German  ships  receive. 

Fourth.  That  for  six  months  after  the  treaty  goes  into  effect  no 
customs  duty  will  be  levied  against  imports  from  the  United  States 
except  the  lowest  duties  that  were  in  force  for  the  first  six  months  of 
1914.  -  < 

Fifth.  Germany’s  agreement  with  us  that  the  United  States  shall 
have  the  privilege  of  reviving  such  of  the  treaties  with  Germany  as 
were  in  existence  prior  to  the  war  as  we  may  alone  desire. 

Sixth.  Germany’s  promisa  to  us  to  restore  the  property  of  our 
citizens  seized  in  Germany  or  to  compensate  the  owners. 

Seventh.  Germany’s  very  important  agreement  validating  all  acts 
by  the  United  States  and  by  the  Alien  Property  Custodian  by  which 
we  seized  and  proceeded  to  liquidate  $800,000,000  worth  of  property 
in  the  United  States  belonging  to  German  citizens. 

Eighth.  Germany’s  agreement  that  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of 
these  propertu  s  may  be  used  to  compensate  our  citizens  in  Germany 
if  Germany  fails  to  do  so,  or  to  pay  debts  which  Germany  or  Germans 
owe  to  American  citizens,  or  to  pay  American  prewar  claims  against 
Germany  for  property  destroyed  and  lives  taken  similar  to  the  losses 
because  of  the  destruction  of  the  Lusitania. 

Ninth.  Germany’s  agreement  that  she  will  compensate  her  own 
citizens  for  property,  patents,  and  other  things  belonging  to  them  in 
the.  United  State  s  seized  during  the  war  by  our  Government. 

Tenth.  Germany’s  agreement  that  no  claim  can  be  made  against 
the  United  States  in  respect  to  the  use  or  sale  during  the  war  by 
our  Government,  or  by  persons  acting  for  our  Government,  of  any 
rights  in  industrial,  literary,  or  artistic  property,  including  patents. 

Eleventh.  Germany’s  agreement  that  the  United  States  shall 
retain  over  500,000  tons  of  German  shipping  seized  in  American 
ports  which  much  more  than  compensate  us  for  shipping  lost  during 
the  war: 

Twelfth.  We  would  lose  our  membership  on  the  reparations  com¬ 
mission  which  will  be  the  most  powerful  international  body  ever 
created  and  which  will  have  enormous  control  over  the  trade  and 
commerce  of  Germany  with  the  rest  of  the  world  for  years  to  come. 
It  not  only  supervises  the  use  of  German  economic  resources  and  the 
payment  of  reparations,  but  it  can  restrict  or  expand  Germany’s 
imports  and  distribute  much  of  her  desirable  exports  including 
dyes.  In  no  way  can  the  United  States  assure  itself  against  dis- 


4 


TREATY  OF  PEACE  WITH  GERMANY. 


crimination  in  German  imports  and  financial  policies  unless  we  have 
a  member  upon  this  great  reparations  commission. 

These  are  some,  but  by  no  means  all  of  the  valuable  concessions, 
which  the  United  States  would  inevitably  sacrifice  by  failing  to 
ratify  the  treaty.  This  failure  would  be  just  as  complete  if  we  adopt 
an  amendment  to  it  as  if  wo  rejected  the  treaty  absolutely.  In 
either  event,  we  would  find  ourselves  at  the  end  of  the  war,  it  is 
true,  but  without  any  peace  or  terms  of  peace  with  Germany.  We 
would  have  abandoned  our  disgusted  associates  and  we  would  be 
reduced  to  the  necessity  of  seeking  a  negotiated  peace  with  an  angry 
Germany  on  such  terms  as  she  would  be  willing  to  accord. 

We  are,  therefore,  without  any  qualification,  against  amendments. 

We  are  aware  that  the  claim  has  been  set  up  that  one  of  the  pro¬ 
posed  amendments  which  relates  only  to  the  league  of  nations  does 
not  require  the  assent  of  Germany.  This  is  based  on  the  fact  that 
Germany  is  not  yet  a  member  of  the  league  of  nations  and  may  not 
be  for  several  years.  The  answer  is,  however,  that  the  league 
covenant  is  a  part  of  the  treaty,  and  the  league  which  is  mentioned 
in  many  places  in  the  treaty  has  much  to  do  with  German  affairs 
even  though  Germany  is  not  a  member.  Germany,  in  agreeing  to  the 
treaty,  has  assented  to  the  provisions  of  the  covenant,  and  one  of  the 
provisions  is  that  it  can  only  be  amended  by  the  action  of  the  league, 
which  has  not  yet  started,  ratified  by  all  the  members  of  the  council, 
which  has  not  yet  organized,  as  well  as  by  a  majority  of  the  members 
of  the  assembly.  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  if  it  is  to  be  amended  in 
any  other  way  Germany’s  assent  will  be  just  as  necessary  as  to  any 
other  article  of  the  treaty. 


RESERVATIONS. 

The  reservations  proposed  by  the  majority  of  this  committee  are  of 
such  a  character  as  at  once  betray  their  authorship.  They  are  the 
work  of  Senators  organized  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  league 
and  if  possible  defeating  this  treaty.  Their  phraseology  is  such  as 
make  this  purpose  plain.  They  are  in  no  sense  interpretative 
reservations  to  be  used  to  make  clear  language  in  the  treaty  that 
might  be  considered  doubtful,  but  they  are  so  framed  as  to  receive  the 
support  of  Senators  who  desire  the  defeat  of  the  treaty.  While  mas¬ 
querading  in  the  guise  of  reservations  they  aie  in  fact  altera  tionsyjof 
the  treaty.  They  have  all  the  vices  of  amendments  and  the  addi¬ 
tional  vice  of  pretending  to  be  what  they  are  not.  Presented  as  parts 
of  the  resolution  to  ratify  the  treaty  they  would  in  fact,  if  adopted, 
result  in  its  defeat.  All  of  them  apply  to  the  league  of  nations 
section  of  the  treaty.  Those  who  oppose  the  league  of  nations  realize 
that  it  is  invincible  on  a  square  fight  and  they  hope  to  destroy  it  by 
this  indirection. 

The  league  of  nations  has  stood  the  test  of  world-wide  criticism  and 
unlimited  attack.  It  stands  to-day  as  the  only  hope  for  world  peace. 
After  all  the  assaults  of  many  months  its  purposes  and  provisions 
stand  out  clearly  defined,  unaffected  by  criticism,  and  unyielding  to 
attack. 


TREATY  OF  PEACE  WITH  GERMANY. 


5 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS. 

The  league  of  nations  proposes  to  organize  the  nations  of  the  world 
for  peace  whereas  they  have  always  heretofore  been  organized  for 
war.  It  proposes  to  establish  the  rule  of  international  justice  in  place 
of  force.  It  proposes  to  make  a  war  of  conquest  impossible  by  uniting 
all  nations  against  the  offender. 

It  is  the  first  international  arrangement  ever  made  by  which  small 
and  weak  nations  are  given  the  organized  strength  of  the  world  for 
protection. 

It  is  a  covenant  between  many  nations  by  which  each  agrees  not 
to  do  certain  things  which  in  the  past  have  produced  wars  and  to  do 
many  things  which  have  been  found  to  preserve  the  peace. 

It  is  a  working  plan  for  the  gradual  reduction  of  armament  by  all 
members  simultaneously  in  proper  proportion  and  by  agreement. 

It  sets  up  arbitration  as  a  friendly  method  of  adjusting  disputes 
and  inquiry  when  arbitration  is  not  agreed  to.  In  both  cases  it  pro¬ 
vides  a  cooling-off  period  of  nine  months  during  which  the  differences 
may  be  adjusted. 

It  preserves  the  territorial  integrity  and  political  independence  of 
each  member  and  leaves  to  each  the  exercise  of  its  sovereign  rights 
as  a  nation. 

It  will  save  the  world  from  wars  and  preparations  for  wars.  It 
will  reduce  armies  and  navies  and  taxes. 

It  will  help  to  remove  the  discontent  with  government  in  all 
countries  by  making  government  beneficent  and  devoting  its  revenues 
to  constructive  rather  than  to  destructive  purposes. 

It  is  the  only  plan  proposed  to  redeem  the  world  from  war,  pesti¬ 
lence  and  famine.  The  only  one  by  which  a  stricken  world  can  be 
redeemed  from  the  disasters  of  the  late  war  and  the  dangers  of 
impending  international  chaos.  Those  who  dally  and  delay  as  they 
seek  with  microscopes  to  find  some  petty  flaw  in  its  structure  have 
nothing  themselves  to  propose.  They  have  appealed  to  every 
prejudice  and  resorted  to  every  desperate  method  of  attack  to  de¬ 
stroy  this  great  international  effort  to  establish  peace,  but  they 
suggest  nothing  in  its  place. 

They  denounce  the  public  demand  for  energetic  action  as  “clamor.” 
They  rail  at  the  President  who  with  the  representatives  of  many  other 
nations  has  devoted  months  of  hard  work  to  a  great  constructive 
effort  to  settle  the  terms  and  reorganize  the  world  for  peace.  Finally, 
unable  to  stem  the  tide  of  public  demand  for  the  league  of  nations 
they  resort  to  so-called  reservations  in  the  hope  that  they  can  destroy 
by  indirection  what  they  have  found  unassailable  by  direct  attack. 

We  renew  our  recommendation  that  the  work  of  the  peace  con¬ 
ference  be  confirmed,  the  will  of  the  people  fulfilled,  and  the  peace 
of  the  world  advanced  by  the  ratification  of  this  treaty — ‘  ‘  the  best  hope 
of  the  world” — even  if  like  all  human  instrumentalities  it  be  not 
divinely  perfect  in  every  detail. 

Gilbert  M.  Hitchcock. 

John  Sharp  Williams. 

Claude  A.  Swanson. 

Atlee  Pomerene. 

Marcus  A.  Smith. 

Key  Pittman. 


o 


